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State Regulation of Religious Education 
Controversies between state education offi-
cials and religious parents began with the es-
tablishment of public schools and continue 
today. Early battles concerned states' au-
thority to outlaw private schooling alto-
gether; contemporary skirmishes center on 
whether and how state regulations govern-
ing teacher certification, the curriculum, and 
470 STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
the like apply to religious parents and 
schools. 
The right of parents to send their children 
to private schools was established in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters (1925). At issue in Pierce 
was an Oregon law outlawing private educa-
tion. Sponsored by the Ku Klux Klan and 
rooted in religious hatred, the Oregon law 
was designed to impose Protestant values on 
Catholic schoolchildren. In Pierce the Court 
ruled that the state could not outlaw private 
schooling and that the Oregon statute would 
cause a state-imposed standardization that is 
contrary to the fundamental theory of liberty 
on which American government is based. For 
the Court, "[t]he child is not the mere creature 
of the State; those who nurture him and direct 
his destiny have the right, coupled with the 
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations." 
Pierce, although critically important to 
religious educators, was rooted in Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process protections and not 
First Amendment religious liberty rights. 
That the First Amendment provides addi-
tional protections for religious parents was 
explicitly recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder 
(1972), in which the Supreme Court held that 
the state's interest in compulsory education 
was not of sufficient magnitude to override a 
parent's interest in having her child exempted 
from public school for religious reasons. 
Although the Court in Yoder recognized the 
legitimacy of a state's interest in mandating 
compulsory education, it upheld the claims of 
members of the Old Order Amish Faith, who 
sought to exempt their children from high 
school attendance. First, the Court empha-
sized the diluted state interest in educating 
14- and 1S-year-old children who were so-
cially acculturated and possessed basic read-
ing, writing, and computation skills. Second, 
the Court accepted the proposition that the 
early teenage years were crucial in determin-
ing whether a child would remain part of the 
Old Order Amish Faith, which therefore ele-
vated the parents' interest in removing their 
children from public schoo!. 
The exemption granted the Amish in 
Yoder should not be construed as an unlim-
ited license for parents to control the educa-
tion of their children. At the outset, the Court 
noted: "There is no doubt as to the power of a 
State, having a high responsibility for educa-
tion of its citizens, to impose reasonable regu-
lations for the control and duration of basic 
education. Providing public schools ranks at S 
the very apex of the function of a state." The 
Court, therefore, would not have permitted 
the removal of Amish children if they were 
too young to have acquired basic academic 
skills. In addition, the Court stressed the self-
contained nature of the Amish community. 
Apparently, the Court would not have ex-
empted the children in Yoder from public 
school attendance if they seemed likely to be-
come members of mainstream society. Finally, 
the Court suggested that it would not accord a 
similar right to parents who wished to remove 
their child from school for nonreligious rea-
sons. The Court emphasized that "[the com-
pulsory attendance law] carries with it 
precisely the kind of objective danger to the 
free exercise of religion that the First 
Amendment was designed to prevent." 
The reaches and limits of Pierce and 
Yoder have been tested through a series of 
challenges by Christian educators to state 
laws governing private schools and home in-
struction. With the Supreme Court declining 
to resolve this dispute, the battle between edu-
cation officials and religious parents takes 
place before state courts and legislators. 
This legal battle between state regulators 
and religious parents and educators appar-
ently pits intractable foes in a fight to the 
death. Religious interests, it seems, reject any 
state involvement in their educational min-
istries. State actors seem likewise unyielding 
in their demand that religious educators 
mimic their public school counterparts. 
The source of the confrontation is wide-
spread dissatisfaction both among fundamen-
talist Christian parents and within the state 
educational establishment. The main reason 
that fundamentalist Christian parents opt out 
of public schools is their perception that the 
schools' "secularization" (attributed to 
Supreme Court decisions prohibiting organized 
prayer, Bible reading, the teaching of biblical 
creationism, and the display of the Ten 
Commandments in classrooms) denies their 
right to oversee the upbringing of their children 
as they see fit. Many fundamentalist Christian 
educators also complain of the perceived 
"breakdown" in public education, which they 
associate with lack of discipline, sexual permis-
siveness, and drug and alcohol abuse. 
In court, fundamentalist Christians at-
tack state regulations as being antireligious 
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and poor educational policy. They depict the 
state education bureaucracy as either insensi-
tive or hostile to the religious mission of fun-
damentalist Christian educators. Unlike 
Catholic, Jewish, and other religious educa-
tors-who often embrace teacher certification 
requirements and other state regulations-
fundamentalist Christian educators and home 
study proponents have greater difficulty com-
plying with state regulations that seek to 
make private schools like public schools. With 
respect to teacher certification requirements, 
for example, fundamentalist educators some-
times claim that the inculcation of secular 
norms through state certification procedures 
are inconsistent with their religious beliefs. 
Furthermore, contending that many such reg-
ulations serve no useful educational purpose, 
fundamentalist Christians deem state regula-
tory initiatives as de facto religious harass-
ment. To support their contention of 
regulatory ineffectiveness, fundamentalist 
Christian educators and parents point to the 
fact that their students generally perform as 
well as or better than their public school 
counterparts on nationally recognized 
achievement tests. 
Weighing against these arguments is the 
state's paramount, compelling interest in the 
education of its youth, which was recognized 
by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka (1954): "[EJducation is 
perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments." Not surprisingly, 
state education officials are reluctant to subor-
dina te their rule-making authority and in-
stincts to validate the deregulatory agenda of 
fundamentalist Christian educators and 
parents. The dispute between state educators 
and religious parents is further complicated by 
the extraordinary variety of regulatory regimes 
available to state lawmakers and regulators. 
State legislators have enacted, to varying 
degrees, regulations that require private sec-
tarian schools to satisfy minimal standards in 
the following areas: fire, health, and safety; 
the curriculum; textbook selection; instruc-
tional time; teacher certification; zoning; con-
sumer protection; student reporting; testing; 
state licensing; community interaction; and 
guidance services. The most controversial of 
these regulations are programmatic ones that 
govern actual teaching practices in nonpublic 
schools, including the curriculum, textbook 
selection, and teacher certification. States con-
tend that such regulations are necessary to en-
sure that all students attain certain minimal 
educational standards that are necessary for 
the welfare of the child and society. 
Regulation of home education likewise is 
extremely varied among the states. At one ex-
treme, some states allow parents to teach their 
children at home with minimal supervision. 
Parents need only provide the state board of 
education with a proposed home study pro-
gram and administer a standardized achieve-
ment test at the end of each school year. At 
the other extreme, some states impose curricu-
lum and teacher approval requirements. 
Furthermore, it is often difficult to ascertain 
what parents must do to have a home study 
program approved by the state or local educa-
tion authority. The primary reason for this con-
fusion is that twenty-one states allow home 
instruction by permitting "equivalent" or 
"comparable" instruction outside of schools. 
As might be expected, the determination of 
equivalency varies considerably from state to 
state and from district to district within a state. 
The Supreme Court, which has not yet 
decided a dispute concerning state regulation 
of home instruction or Christian schooling, 
has provided limited guidance about states' 
authority in this area. Currently, the Supreme 
Court explicitly recognizes the constitutional-
ity of reasonable state regulations of private 
schools that promote a compelling state inter-
est in education. In Board of Education v. 
Allen (1968), for example, the Court observed 
that "[sJince Pierce, a substantial body of case 
law has confirmed the power of the States to 
insist that attendance at private schools, if it is 
to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, 
be at institutions which provide minimum 
hours of instruction, employ teachers of speci-
fied training and cover prescribed subjects of 
instruction." In other words, because the state 
cannot abolish parochial schools, it must sat-
isfy its secular interests in education via pri-
vate schools. Therefore, the state must have 
the authority to regulate the secular educa-
tional function of private and home schools. 
Numerous other Supreme Court decisions 
have recognized the rights of a state to impose 
reasonable regulations on private schools. But 
the Supreme Court has yet to determine where 
it should draw the line between reasonable 
and unreasonable state regulations. 
Needless to say, state officials and reli-
gIOus educators subscribe to quite different 
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theories of what regulations are "reasonable," 
and judicial attempts to resolve this dispute 
have been truly unsatisfactory. Such cases 
often present courts with an apparently hope-
less entanglement of fact, judgment, secular 
values, and religious conviction; as a result, 
court decisions are often at odds with one an-
other. Some courts approve and others invali-
date identical regulatory schemes. There are 
also great variances within a state. State and 
local education officials are inconsistent in ap-
plying the often vague regulatory demands, 
and they are selective in enforcing the law. 
The variability of judicial decisionmaking 
is apparent in competing judicial perceptions 
of teacher certification requirements. Courts 
that rule for the state see themselves as " ill-
equipped to act as school boards and deter-
mine the need for discrete aspects of a 
compulsory school education program"; they 
argue "that it goes without saying that the 
State has a compelling interest in the quality 
and ability of those who [teach] its young peo-
ple" (State v. Shauer [N.D., 1980], State v. 
Faith Baptist Church [Neb., 1981]). Courts 
that side with religious interests appear 
equally presumptive. They find it "difficult to 
imagine ... a state interest sufficiently sub-
stantial to sanction abrogation of [the par-
ent's] liberty to direct the education of their 
children," and, although seeing a bachelor's 
degree as an "indicator" of competency, they 
nonetheless find a bachelor's requirement ex-
cessive because "it is not a sine qua non the 
absence of which establishes [incompetency]" 
(State v. Whisner [Ohio, 1976], Kentucky 
State Board v. Rudasill [Ky., 1980]). 
Vagaries in judicial approaches are a re-
sult of many factors. Poor lawyering by some 
state prosecutors and by some attorneys for 
fundamentalist Christian educators offers a 
partial explanation for this judicial failure. 
Varying regulatory schemes are also at issue. 
More significantly, Supreme Court decisions 
provide ample support for each side. 
Disputes between the state and funda -
mentalist Christian educators are ill suited to 
judicial resolution. These days, it is doubtful 
that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if denied the opportunity for an 
education . Because of the centrality of the 
state's interest in ensuring the provision of 
good education to all youngsters, the state is 
vested with the authority to establish reason-
able regulations governing both public and 
private schools. The state, however, bears a S 
great cost when it engages in open confronta-
tion with fundamentalist Christian educators. 
The chief problem is one of enforceable sanc-
tions. Under its parens patriae power, the state 
can, on occasion, assume custody of a child if 
that is in the child's best interest. For example, 
the state may exercise this power in the face of 
parental neglect. While the state most fre-
quently exercises its parens patriae power to 
prevent physical abuse and neglect of chil-
dren, the state also has authority under this 
power to enforce truancy statutes. 
Fundamentalist Christian educators have 
been willing to push the state to this extreme. 
Yet, for many reasons, states do not want to 
reach this degree of confrontation. The clos-
ing of churches, the jailing of individuals for 
practicing their religion, and the displacement 
of children demand a compelling justification. 
With fundamentalist Christian school and 
home study students outperforming their pub-
lic school counterparts, and with increasing 
public awareness of problems with public 
school education, the state cannot offer a 
compelling justification for its enforcement 
actions. Moreover, with public attention fo-
cused on public schools, it is politically coun-
terproductive for the state to expend scarce 
educational resources on the enforcement of 
controversial private school and home study 
regulations. 
Deregulation of religious education-or 
nonenforcement of regulations-seems a sen-
sible political solution. Confrontations be-
tween the state and fundamentalist Christian 
educators are politically divisive, and, if car-
ried to their logical extreme, ultimately may 
force the state to jail parents and ministers 
and seek custody of children. Additionally, if 
the state feels compelled to reverse its previ-
ous policies, it may appear weak, and its inter-
est in education will be subject to challenge. In 
many instances, the most expedient political 
course is to strike a balance favoring re ligious 
liberty and parental rights. 
Massive legislative reform of both home 
instruction and church-affiliated schools bears 
this out. Some states, however, have elected to 
avoid conflicts with dissenting religious par-
ents and educators by scrapping all meaning-
ful regulations. In these states, students need 
not demonstrate proficiency in core subject 
areas. Instead, they need only take a standard-
ized achievement test. But to mandate test 
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taking without mandating a minimal passing 
score is to substitute the state's critical interest 
in the education of its youth with a symbolic 
fig leaf. 
The challenge for lawmakers and regula-
tors, as recognized by the National 
Association of State Boards of Education, is 
" to meet their obligations to assure all chil-
dren receive a quality education while consid-
ering the relative rights of parents to educate 
their children. " This challenge cannot be ig-
nored. At the most practical level, many stu-
dents participating in home study programs 
and attending fundamentalist Christian 
schools will later be "absorbed" into public 
school systems. More significant, the state's 
interest in the well-being of its children as well 
as its own well-being demands that these chil-
dren not be discounted. 
Neal Devins 
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